Peter Dear has traced a shift in the source of reliable empirical premises for demonstrations in early modern natural philosophy. Prior to the seventeenth century, such premises were drawn from common experience -from the shared knowledge, attested in authoritative texts, of what happens always or for the most part in the ordinary course of nature. But in the first half of the seventeenth century, empirical premises began to be drawn with increasing frequency from particular experience -that is, from knowledge of what happened on particular occasions. This shift occurred in part because of rising skepticism with respect to the reliability of authoritative texts, but also because of the increasing reliance of natural philosophers upon observations made with rare and expensive instruments which were outside the experience of all but an elite few, such as the telescope and the vacuum pump.
which often did not agree with each other and which appeared to contain errors and accretions even when they did agree, to a commonly accepted reading of that text, which could be justified as an accurate reflection of the actual words' ancient authority. The structural similarity of these two problems of inference suggests the possibility of causal connections between the practice of textual criticism and the practice of natural philosophy in the seventeenth century. This essay is concerned with exploring that possibility.
The hypothesis to be explored, then, is that the practices and patterns of inference which seventeenth-century natural philosophers employed to adjudicate disagreements among observation reports were influenced and informed by those which textual critics used to resolve differences among extant manuscript copies of an ancient text. This hypothesis is most plausible with respect to those natural philosophers who not only had some familiarity with textual criticism but also worked in milieus in which the integrated hermeneutical practice of the two books, nature and scripture, continued to hold sway. 'Integrated hermeneutical practice' is Peter Harrison's term for the robust entanglement (characteristic of the medieval period and the Renaissance) between the practices and patterns of inference employed in the interpretation of texts and those employed in the interpretation of natural effects and objects. Harrison has argued that the Protestant emphasis on literal interpretation of scripture contributed to the dissolution of integrated hermeneutical practice in the Protestant world in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 2 But this dissolution proceeded at a slower pace in the Catholic world, where the practices and patterns of inference of natural philosophy and those of textual hermeneutics continued to be tools from the same toolbox throughout the seventeenth century. The Catholic natural philosophers who were likeliest to have received some training in biblical hermeneutics and textual criticism were members of learned religious orders. The above hypothesis is most plausible, then, with respect to those natural philosophers who were members of such orders.
The most obvious testing ground for the above hypothesis is in the work of Jesuit natural philosophers. William Ashworth has identified several admirable traits in the practice of seventeenth-century Jesuit natural philosophers: a 'particular zest for experimental science', an 'appreciation of the value of collaboration', and a 'keen sense of the value of precision in experimental science -a sense that was not widely echoed by many of their more illustrious contemporaries'.
3 Jesuit natural philosophers merit praise insofar as they 'practiced science on a wide scale, were able (and often inspired) investigators, made many important
